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Article 2212a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, the Compar-
ative Negligence and Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,
took effect on September 1, 1973. It made significant changes in the
respective rights and liabilities of injured persons and tortfeasors in
negligence cases.' This paper is principally concerned with multiple
tortfeasor cases, and with section 2 of article 2212a, which modified
principles concerning joint and several liability, contribution, and
settlement. Prior to the enactment of article 2212a, each tortfeasor
whose negligent behavior proximately caused an indivisible injury
to another was jointly and severally liable to the injured party. This
principle has been altered by section 2(c) of article 2212a. 2 Before
the enactment of 2212a, contributution among joint tortfeasors was
governed by article 2212 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes and a
substantial body of case law.' In negligence cases4 article 2212a su-
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1. The most obvious and important change is the elimination of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine, whereby any negligence of a claimant that was a proximate cause of the event
barred recovery. Several other tort doctrines have been eliminated by court decisions consid-
ering the effects of article 2212a. See, e.g., French v. Grigsby, 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978)(last
clear chance or discovered peril); Davila v: Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1977)(imminent
peril); Farley v. M M Cattle Company, 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975)(assumption oT risk).
2. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
3. Obviously any statute of significance to litigation will have a substantial case-law
gloss, so that explicit reference to the "substantial body of decisional law" under article 2212
may be superfluous. However, the judicial amendments to this statute have been so very
extensive that the emphasis seems advisable.
Article 2212 reads as follows:
Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered in
any suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort, except in causes wherein the
right of contribution or of indemnity, or of recovery, over, by and between the
defendants is given by statute or exists under the common law shall, upon payment
of said judgment, have a right of action against his co-defendant or co-defendants
and may recover from each a sum equal to the proportion of all of the defendants
named in said judgment rendered to the whole amount of said judgment. If any of
said persons co-defendant be insolvent, then recovery may be had in proportion as
such defendant or defendants are not insolvent; and the right of recovery over
against such insolvent defendant or defendants in judgment shall exist in favor of
each defendant in judgment in proportion as he has been caused to pay by reason
934 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:933
persedes article 2212.1 Under prior law, the impact of a settlement
by one tortfeasor upon the liability of other tortfeasors was con-
trolled by Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins.' In negligence
cases, the effects of settlements are now controlled by sections 2(d)
and (e) of article 2212a.7
The full ramifications of these modifications of Texas negli-
gence law are yet to be determined. One purpose of this article is to
explore questions raised by the Texas comparative negligence stat-
of such insolvency (emphasis added).
TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). The emphasized clause needs explanation.
There is no common law right to contribution in Texas. Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States,
283 F. Supp. 14, 24 (S.D. Tex. 1968). Since passage of the statute, contribution rights have
been worked out under it. There did exist a common-law right to indemnity in certain
situations at the time of article 2212's enactment. Hence, what the clause means is
contribution is available under this statute unless indemnity is available under the decisional
law. See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962), and authorities cited therein.
The statute requires that the tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought have been sued
by plaintiff in the same action brought against the tortfeasor who is seeking contribution. Yet,
it is clear that one tortfeasor may implead another for contribution. TEx. R. Civ. P. 38, 51;
see also Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964); Callihan Interests,
Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd). One tortfeasor
may also bring a separate suit for contribution. Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177
S.W.2d 774 (1944); see note 11 infra. The statute requires that the tortfeasor who seeks
contribution first pay the judgment rendered in plaintiff's favor.
4. Contribution issues in tort cases in which plaintiff seeks recovery on grounds other
than negligence continue to be controlled by article 2212. Contribution issues may arise in
cases in which a plaintiff achieves recovery against one defendant on the basis of negligence,
another on the basis of strict liability. It is not clear what the proper combination of the
features of article 2212 and article 2212a should be in such situations. General Motors Corp.
v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 861-63 (Tex. 1977), held that article 2212 governed contribution
issues in such a case, but the facts on which that decision was based arose before the effective
date of article 2212a. The court deplored the difficulties present in such cases and called for
legislative assistance.
5. Article 2212a states that section 2 "prevails over Article 2212 ... and all other laws
to the extent of any conflict." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(h) (Vernon Supp.
1978-1979). Two commentators have suggested that article 2212a may be inapplicable in
negligence cases in which plaintiff is found free from negligence. The argument is based on
language keying the contribution features of the Act to situations in which plaintiff's
"negligence does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants." Id. § 2(b); Keeton,
Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1978); Keeton, Annual Survey of
Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1974); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 85 (1978). It would create a great deal of
confusion and difficulty should the statute be interpreted that way, as both commentators
acknowledge. See Keeton, 28 Sw. L.J., supra at 10-11; Comment, 10 ST. MARY's L.J., supra
at 85. In at least one reported decision under article 2212a in which plaintiff was found guilty
of no negligence, it was assumed without discussion that 2212a controls. City of Gatesville v.
Truelove, 546 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
6. 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964), noted in 43 TExAs L. Rav. 118 (1964).
7. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 2(d), 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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ute in order to clearly identify future problems. Part I of this article
will examine the changes made by a few reported decisions, includ-
ing arguments for and against the debatable interpretations of arti-
cle 2212a. It incorporates much of the standard interpretation or
sets of assumptions contained in the now substantial body of period-
ical literature discussing Texas comparative negligence! Part II
suggests methods for resolving the statute's interpretation prob-
lems. Neither article 2212a nor article 2212 discusses the problem
of indemnity among joint tortfeasors. However, the procedural is-
sues involved in indemnity cases are the same as those presented
in contribution cases.
I.
The following discussion will treat a series of hypothetical cases
under prior law and under article 2212a.1 Case 1 is a prior law case.
Case la is the same situation under 2212a. Case lb is a slightly
different hypothetical case under 2212a in which the plaintiff is
negligent to an extent that reduces but does not preclude recovery.' 0
In all hypotheticals and variations thereof, the jury will find that
$10,000 is fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiffs indivisi-
ble injury. In the 2212a cases in which plaintiff is not negligent, the
jury will find: Tortfeasor A's negligence was 50% of the total; B's,
30%; C's, 20%. In the 2212a cases in which plaintiff is negligent, the
jury will find: Plaintiffs negligence was 20%; tortfeasor A's, 50%;
8. See Adams, Special Considerations for the Negligent Plaintiff Under Comparative
Negligence: Joinder of Defendants and the Feasibility of 100% Recovery, 11 TEx. TRIAL LAW.
F. 7, 8-9 (1976); Fisher, Contribution and Iridemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 13 TEx. TRiAL
LAW. F. 3 (1979); Fisher, Nugent, & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 655, 662-66 (1974); see also Abraham & Riddle, Comparative
Negligence-A New Horizon, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 411, 418 (1973); Giessel & Giessel, Texas
Comparative Negligence Law, 8 TEX. TRIAL LAW. F. 14 (1973); Keeton, Annual Survey of
Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1974); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 83-84, 90 (1978); Comment, Multiple Party
Litigation in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement
Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 677, 681 (1978).
9. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
10. It is clear that a party's negligence is of no significance unless it was a proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injuries. See Ingles v. Cohen, 543 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Howard v. Bachman, 524 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975,
no writ).
Hereafter in this article, when we state that a jury found a party negligent or that a jury
determined a party's negligence at N%, we mean that party was found guilty of negligence
that'was a proximate cause of the injuries. We will not reiterate the proximate cause require-
ment at every juncture, but will assume it is understood as implicit.
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B's, 20%; C's, 10%. Using these percentages for the sake of illustra-
tion, the basic method of calculating the parties' rights and liabili-
ties is as follows:
P ($10,000 damages) vs. A B C
20% negligent 50% negligent 20% negligent 10% negligent
P should recover $8,000 (his full damages less a deduction for
his percentage of negligence. Article 2212a, section 1).
A is jointly and severally liable for the full $8,000. (Article
2212a, section 2(c)). However, A is entitled to contribution from B
and C such that his net liability should not exceed $5,000, repre-
senting his net 50% of the total damages. (Article 2212a, section
2(b)). [We will term the net, post-contribution liability of a defen-
dant as his contribution share.]
B is jointly and severally liable for the full $8,000. (Article
2212a, section 2(c)). B is entitled to contribution from A and C
such that his net liability-his contribution share-should not ex-
ceed $2,000 representing his 20% of the total damages. (Article
2212a, section 2(b)).
C is not liable for the full $8,000, because his negligence was
"less than" plaintiffs. (Article 2212a, section 2(c)). C's liability to
plaintiff does not exceed C's contribution share, $1,000 (Article
2212a, sections 2(b), 2(c)).
1. Contribution rights among named defendants, none of whom
has settled. [P v. A, B, C. All defendants seek contribution in main
action.]
Case 1. Prior law. Plaintiff not negligent; each defendant negli-
gent.
Judgment for plaintiff against A, B, and C, jointly and sever-
ally, for $10,000. This means that each of the three tortfeasors is
liable, jointly and severally with the other two, for the full amount
of the judgment. Plaintiff can obtain only one satisfaction of his
judgment, but can enforce the judgment against any of the three
tortfeasors in any combination or sequence. Each of the three tort-
feasors has a contribution claim against the other two; thus each
ultimately should bear no more than 1/3 of the total liability. The
tortfeasors probably do not have to assert that right by filing cross-
claims against each other."
11. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(e). It has been held that, despite the wording of article 2212,
a defendant may bring a separate action for contribution against a putative tortfeasor not
[Vol. 10:933
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Case Ia. 2212a. P not negligent; A, 50%; B, 30%; C, 20%.
Article 2212a makes two changes. First, the contribution shares
of A, B, and C are computed in accordance with the percentage of
negligence attributable to each defendant ($5,000, $3,000, and
$2,000 respectively) rather than $3,333.33 for each defendant." Sec-
ond, cross-claims for contribution are now mandatory.'"
Case lb. 2212a. P's negligence, 20%; A's, 50%; B's, 20%; C's,
10%.
Plaintiff's conributory negligence is not an absolute bar to re-
covery;'" his recovery is reduced by his percentage of negligence' 5
from $10,000 to $8,000. Tortfeasors A and B are jointly and severally
liable for $8,000.' Tortfeasor C, whose negligence is "less than that
of the [plaintiff]"' is liable for only that portion of the judgment
that represents the percentage of negligence attributable to him, or
$1,000. The contribution shares of A, B, and C are $5,000, $2,000,
and $1,000 respectively. Again, cross-claims for contribution are
mandatory.
2. Contribution rights of named defendants against putative tort-
feasor not sued by plaintiff; no settlement. [P v. B and C. B and C
seek contribution from A.]
Case 2. Prior law. Plaintiff not negligent. Each defendant negli-
gent. Putative tortfeasor negligent.
Judgment for plaintiff against B and C, jointly and severally,
for $10,000. Each defendant has a contribution right against the
other for 1/2 of the judgment. The contribution right may be as-
sued by plaintiff, Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1944), at least
when "the unnamed defendant was not known of at the time of the first suit or ... there
was a procedural bar preventing the third party defendant's joinder in the primary suit."
Comment, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 11 Hous. L. Rxv. 101, 113-14 (1973). Compare
Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of
Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 686 (1978)(subsequent contribution action
only in "those instances in which jurisdiction, though not possible at the time of suit, was
later obtained and when default judgments had been obtained based on deficient service of
process"); see also Houser v. Harris, 44 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931, no
writ).
12. Tax. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
13. Article 2212a, § 2(g), makes it clear that contribution claims among "named defen-
dants" must be asserted in the primary lawsuit. TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g)
(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
14. Id. § 1.
,15. Id.
16. Tax. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
17. Id.
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serted by filing a cross-claim for contribution." Either B or C
could seek contribution from A by joining A as a third-party de-
fendant," assuming no venue problems are encountered. 0 In the
third-party action, the tortfeasor seeking contribution from A would
have to establish that A was a joint tortfeasor-that A would have
been liable to plaintiff had plaintiff sued him. A successful third-
party action would not make A liable to plaintiff because plaintiff
did not sue A, but it would mean that A's liability to B and C for
1/3 of the $10,000 judgment would be established.
As an alternative, B or C may wait until the conclusion of the
action by plaintiff and then seek contribution from A in a separate
lawsuit.2 Again, the success of the action would depend upon
whether A was shown to be a joint tortfeasor. Presumably the dam-
ages on which the contribution share of A is based would be the
amount fixed by the jury in the contribution suit, but that share
would not exceed the amount received in the primary suit."2
Case 2a. 2212a. P not negligent. Had A been sued, his negli-
gence would have been set at 50%; B's, 30%; C's, 20%.
A, whose negligence has been hypothetically set at 50%, is ini-
tially missing from the picture. Forget about A for the moment and
assume that the jury in plaintiff's action against B and C considers
plaintiff blameless and views the relative blameworthiness of B and
C the same way the jury in the three-defendant hypothetical would
view it. On those assumptions, the negligence percentage findings
would be: P, 0%; B, 60%; C, 40%. Judgment will be rendered for
plaintiff against B and C, jointly and severally, for $10,000. B's and
C's contribution shares, which they must assert by filing cross-
claims,2 3 are $6,000 and $4,000, respectively.
Presumably B and C have the right to implead A for contribu-
tion, assuming no venue problems are encountered. 4 Nothing in
18. See note 11 supra.
19. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 38.
20. See discussion of venue problems notes 103-17 infra and accompanying text. See
Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 216 S.W.2d 563 (1949); Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142
Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774 (1944); Safway Scaffold Co. v. Safway Steel Products, 570 S.W.2d
225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield,
385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd).
21. See note 11 supra. See also Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd); Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw.
L.J. 1, 11 (1974). A payment of more than a party's contribution share is a prerequisite to
recovery of judgment against another for contribution in a separate action.
22. See Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 12 (1974).
23. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
24. See notes 103-17 infra for a full discussion of venue.
[Vol. 10:933
1979] NEGLIGENCE
2212a negates the right, and section 2(g) supports it by implica-
tion.25 However, must an impleaded defendant's percentage of negli-
gence be submitted to the jury by virtue of section 2(b) of article
2212a? 6 If not, presumably the jury would consider only whether A
was a joint tortfeasor. On an affirmative finding, B and C would be
entitled to contribution from A in the amount of 1/3 of the $10,000
liability, perhaps shared equally,27 or perhaps shared according to
B's and C's percentages of negligence.2 1 If, on the other hand, the
impleaded defendant's percentage of negligence was submitted to
the jury and fixed at 50%, plaintiff's rights in 'this case-in which
he is free from fault 2"-would be unaffected, because B and C would
remain jointly and severally liable for the full $10,000.10 But B and
C would be entitled to contribution from A in the amount of
$5,000.3'
In the absence of a third-party action by a named defendant
against A, either because one was not attempted or because venue
problems could not be avoided, it is unlikely there could be any
determination of the percentage of A's negligence in the primary
lawsuit. 32 Again, however, this would make no difference to plaintiff
25. Article 2212a, § 2(g): "All claims for contribution between named defendants in the
primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a named defendant may
proceed against a person not a party to the primary suit who has not effected a settlement
with the claimant." Id. § 2(g).
26. In other words, is a third-party defendant one of the "defendants" referred to in §
2(b)? Under § 2(a)(2) "defendant" includes any party from whom a claimant seeks relief. Id.
§ 2(a)(2). Section 2(a)(1) provides that "[cilaimant means any party seeking relief, whether
he is a plaintiff, counter-claimant, or cross-claimant." Id. § 2(a)(1). From the standpoint of
purity of terminology, the third-party action is not a counterclaim or a cross-claim. See Tax.
R. Civ. P. 38, 97. Moreover, § 2(g) appears to draw a distinction between contribution claimed
among tortfeasors made parties by plaintiff and contribution claims against persons not
parties to the primary suit. One commentator appears to have assumed that the percentage
would be submitted and that the third-party defendant would be treated as a defendant sued
by plaintiff. Adams, Special Considerations for the Negligent Plaintiff Under Comparative
Negligence: Joinder of Defendants and the Feasibility of 100% Recovery, 11 TEx. TRIAL LAw.
F. 7, 8 (1976). He recognizes, however, that "a careful defense counsel representing a target
but not so negligent defendant will not recklessly join additional parties defendant whose
negligence in the aggregate is likely to push the total negligence up to or above the fifty
percent benchmark of liability." Id.
27. If one views the third-party contribution action as governed by article 2212, rather
than 2212a, B and C would share equally in the contribution award.
28. Section 2(d) supplies a powerful analogy in support of B and C sharing A's payment
in accordance with their percentages of negligence, as opposed to equally.
29. See, e.g., Case 2b infra.
30. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
'31. See note 21 supra.
32. Article 2212a contains language in §§ 2(d) and 2(e) (the settlement provisions) that
clearly indicates the legislature assumed a non-party's percentage of negligence cannot be
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because he is not negligent.
Case 2b. 2212a. P's negligence, 20%. Had A been sued, his
negligence would have been set at 50%; B's, 20%; C's, 10%.
Once again, A, whose negligence has been hypothetically set at
50%, initially is missing from the picture. Forget about A for the
moment and assume that the jury in plaintiff s action against B and
C sees plaintiffs relatively slight negligence as a constant-20% of
the total-and views the relative blameworthiness of B and C the
same way the jury in the three-defendant hypothetical would view
it. On these assumptions, the negligence percentage findings would
be: P, 20%; B, 53.33%; C, 26.67%. 33 On these findings, B and C
determined. The law review articles that discuss article 2212a make the same assumption.
See, e.g., Fisher, Nugent, & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice,
5 ST. MARY's L.J. 655, 662-66 (1974); see also Abraham & Riddle, Comparative Negligence-A
New Horizon, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 411, 418 (1973). Cases decided prior to 2212a make a similar
assumption, see, e.g., Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
On the other hand, Dean Keeton has suggested that "[flailure to join an alleged settling
tortfeasor neither precludes nor, arguably, should it preclude the submission of the existence
or amount of his negligence." Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1,
14 (1974). Does the same idea apply to a non-settling tortfeasor? If so, we would be permitting
one defendant to force another defendant on the plaintiff even when a third-party action is
unavailable. The reasoning would be that failure to submit the percentage would prejudice
the named defendant or defendants by increasing their negligence percentages. See TEx. R.
Civ. P. 39(a). This argument makes more sense when we assume that the jury sees plaintiff's
negligence as a constant. This reasoning appears to have been rejected by the Wisconsin
courts. See Hardware Mutual Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Sons, 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577
(1959); see also Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); Patterson v.
Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., 227 Wis. 11, 277 N.W. 636 (1938). It should be noted that the
pre-2212a cases can be distinguished on the basis that the requirement that the settling party
be made a party defendant is pure dictum in all of them. See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d
409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
33. What we have done here is redistribute the "missing" A's negligence between the
remaining defendants. The three-defendant hypothetical is as follows:
P-20% B-20%
A-50% C-10%
Holding P's 20% as constant and redistributing A's share proportionately between B and C,
we get:
P 20%
B 2/3 of 80%, or 53.33%
C 1/3 of 80%, or 26.67%
Obviously, the assumption that the jury would make the same 20% finding for P, whether
or not A was a defendant, is arbitrary. An equally sensible assumption would be that A's
"missing" negligence would be redistributed among plaintiff, A, and B. On that view, the
finding would be:
P 2/5, or 40%
B 2/5, or 40%
C 1/5, or 20%
NEGLIGENCE
would be jointly and severally liable to plaintiff for $8,000;:1 B's
contribution share would be 53.33% of $10,000 (2/3 of $8,000), and
C's would be 26.67% of $10,000 (1/3 of $8,000). 35
However, it is likely that A would be impleaded for contribu-
tion.:" Once again, the threshold question is whether A's percentage
of negligence should be submitted to the jury. 7 If not, presumably
the jury would consider only whether A was a joint tortfeasor. On
an affirmative finding, B and C would be entitled to contribution
from A in the amount of 1/3 of the $8,000 liability, perhaps shared
equally" and perhaps shared according to B's and C's percentages
of negligence. 9 If, on the other hand, the impleaded defendant's
percentage of negligence was submitted to the jury and fixed at
50%, B and C would be entitled to contribution from A in the
amount of $5,000.10 Hence, B would be entitled to 2/3 of the $5,000,
and C to 1/3.
Obviously, it is significant to the named defendants whether
the impleaded defendant's percentage of negligence is submitted to
the jury. On the assumed percentages in this case, A's contribution
share is greater than the 1/3 pro rata share A would have owed
under prior law as one of three tortfeasors, shared according to B's
and C's percentages of negligence." It is important to all the
defendants whether the impleaded defendant's percentage of
negligence is submitted because only occasionally will the percent-
age found equal a pro rata share. The more elusive fact is that
sometimes the plaintiff will be equally concerned about the sub-
mission of the impleaded defendant's negligence.
The submission of the impleaded A's negligence to the jpry on
the present set of assumptions yields these findings: Plaintiff's neg-
34. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
35. If the assumption is made that A's "missing" negligence is going to be redistributed
proportionately among plaintiff, B, and C (see note 32 supra) as opposed to between B and
C only, the outcome of the case without A in it would be that plaintiff is entitled to a recovery
of $6,000. B would be jointly and severally liable for the full $6,000, but C's liability would
be for $2,000 only. B's and C's contribution shares would be $4,000 and $2,000, respectively.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
36. Once again, venue problems might prevent this. See notes 103-17 infra and accom-
panying text.
37. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
40. See note 21 supra.
41. In effect, A benefits from non-submission. Of course, if his percentage of negligence
is less than the 1/3 pro rata share which A would have owed under prior law, non-submission
will increase his contribution share.
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ligence, 20%; A's, 50%; B's, 20%; C's, 10%. Because plaintiff did not
sue A, presumably he is entitled to no recovery from A. His recovery
is $8,000. B is jointly and severally liable for that amount, but C is
liable for only $1,000, because his negligence is "less than" plain-
tiff's.42 Should B be insolvent, plaintiff's recovery has been dimin-
ished by the submission of A's negligence percentage-absent that
submission P would probably recover more from C because a redis-
tribution of the negligence percentages would certainly result in an
increase of C's percentage. Suppose, for instance, that the jury in
plaintiff's case against B and C finds plaintiff's negligence at 40%,
B's at 40%, and C's at 20%.1 On these findings, with A absent from
the picture, plaintiff would recover $6,000; B would be jointly and
severally liable for the full $6,000, but C's liability would be for
$2,000.11 Should B be insolvent, plaintiff is limited to a $2,000 recov-
ery.45
Is the proper solution to submit the impleaded defendant's per-
centage of negligence to the jury, or is it better to determine only
whether the impleaded defendant would have been liable to plain-
tiff had plaintiff sued him? The latter course amounts to the coriclu-
sion that third-party actions for contribution against putative tort-
feasors who are not named as defendants by the plaintiff be viewed
as separate lawsuits from plaintiff's action and that article 2212,
rather than 2212a, controls the contribution action.
The same question arises when B or C brings a separate action
for contribution against A. Presumably, B and C continue to have
that right.48 The provisions of 2212a do not clearly control the suit. 7
If article 2212a were held to control, B and C (in addition to the
requirement of showing that A would have been liable to plaintiff
had plaintiff sued A)"8 would have to obtain a determination of A's
42. See note 30 supra.
43. See note 33 supra.
44. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
45. See note 35 supra.
46. See Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 11 (1974). See also
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
47. But see Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 11-12
(1974)(assuming that article 2212a would control); Comment, Comparative Negligence in
Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV. 101, 113 (1973); Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative
Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 675-
76, 678 (1978); see also Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas
Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 84-85 (1978).
48. See cases cited at note 56 infra.
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percentage of negligence." On the assumption that the second jury
must allocate the total negligence among all parties to the event,
including the plaintiff, so that their percentages equal 100%,511 a
redetermination of B's and C's percentage of negligence would be
required. Possibly, the second jury would also redetermine dam-
ages; probably the damages in the contribution action would be the
lesser of the amount fixed by the jury in the primary suit and the
amount found by the second jury.5'
Aside from potential collateral estoppel problems,52 it is unde-
sirable to require a second jury to reach a different allocation of the
negligence and damages between the tortfeasors.5 3 The best solution
would be to require that contribution claims be made by im-
pleader-compulsory impleader. However, the difficulty could be
met by holding that article 2212, rather than 2212a, controls the
subsequent action and that damages are not to be redetermined in
the second suit.54 Under 2212, a successful contribution suit against
A would result in a judgment against A for 1/3 of the liability B and
C incurred in the first lawsuit.
3. Contribution rights of named defendants against putative tort-
feasor who settled with plaintiff and who was not made party to the
main lawsuit. [A settles with P. P v. B and C. B and C do not
implead A.]
Case 3. Prior law. Plaintiff not negligent. Each defendant negli-
gent. Settling tortfeasor negligent.
Plaintiff, prior to the institution of any litigation, makes a set-
tlement agreement with A whereby A is released from liability5 to
49. See Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1974).
50. For an apparent attack on that notion-which everyone else has taken as a neces-
sary bedrock assumption-see Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative Negli-
gence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 681 n.85
(1978).
51. See Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1974).
52. See Hardy v. Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refrd
n.r.e.); see also Baker v. Story, 564 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ);
Olivarez v. Broadway Hardware, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. See Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete
Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 678-79 (1978).
54. This is Professor Robertson's view. TEx. REv. STAT. ANN. art 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1978-1979).
55. Until the decision in McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971), this
had to be done by a covenant not to sue or similar contrivance, rather than a release as such.
McMillen holds that only those parties named or otherwise specifically identified in the
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plaintiff in exchange for $1,000. Plaintiff then sues B and C. Neither
B nor C brings a third-party action against A;5" thus, the existence
of A's negligence is not submitted to the jury. However, B and C
bring the settlement agreement to the attention of the trial judge
and seek a pro tanto reduction in their liability to plaintiff. Judg-
ment is rendered for plaintiff against B and C, jointly and severally,
for $9,000. The $10,000 potential liability is credited with the
amount of payment by A.57 B's and C's contribution rights between
themselves should ' be asserted in the main lawsuit, and each ulti-
mately should bear $4,500 liability. B and C may not sue A in a
subsequent lawsuit because by settling with plaintiff, A has bought
his peace. ' On the assumed facts, B and C lost $2,333.33 by failing
to show that A was a joint tortfeasor. On the other hand, had A
settled with plaintiff for $6,000, the credit awarded B and C would
render A's tortfeasor status immaterial because it would have been
greater than would have been A's proportionate share of the $10,000
liability ($3,333.33).
Case 3a. 2212a. Plaintiff not negligent. Had A been sued, his
negligence would have been set at 50%; B's at 30%; C's at 20%.
B and C are liable to plaintiff, jointly and severally, for $9,000.
Their contribution shares between themselves are 3/5 and 2/5, re-
spectively, or $5,400 and $3,600. B and C benefit from the $1,000
deduction resulting from A's settlement in that amount according
to their percentages of negligence, rather than equally.6 0 If A settled
before any litigation and the existence and percentage of his negli-
release agreement are released from liability. Id.; compare Spradley v. McCracklin, 505
S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
56. The weight of authority requires defendants to implead the settlor and show that
he would have been liable to plaintiff if sued in order to get a proportionate reduction in
their liability to plaintiff. See Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Skyline Cab Co. v. Bradley, 325 S.W.2d 176, 183 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ refd n.r.e.); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 82, 89-90 (1978). However, there are one
or two countervailing cases that imply that it is not a requirement to the assertion of
proportionate-reduction contribution that the settlor be joined. See Deal v. Madison, 576
S.W.2d 409, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ); see also Gill v. United States, 429
F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. See Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Skyline Cab Co. v. Bradley, 325 S.W.2d 176, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Powell v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 396 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tex.
1975)(no credit?).
58. See note 11 supra.
59. See note 56 supra.
60. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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gence are not submitted to the jury," B and C get only a pro tanto
credit.
Case 3b. 2212a. P's negligence, 20%. Had A been sued, his
negligence would have been set at 50%; B's at 20%; C's at 10%.
Continuing with the assumption that the percentage of the neg-
ligence of the settling tortfeasor is not submitted to the jury, we
must reallocate the percentages of negligence among plaintiff, B,
and C. If the same ratios are maintained," the finding would be:
Plaintiff, 40%; B, 40%; and C, 20%. Plaintiff's maximum potential
recovery from B and C is $6,000 minus the $1,000 settlement pro-
ceeds that will be divided between B and C in accordance with their
respective percentages of negligence.
If A's percentage of negligence had been submitted and the
section 2(e) formula employed, plaintiff's judgment would be re-
duced not only by his own percentage of negligence but by A's also.
Hence, his judgment would be for $3,000. B would be liable for the
full $3,000. C's liability would be for $1,000 only.
4. Contribution rights of named defendants against putative tort-
feasor who settled with plaintiff and who was made party to the
main lawsuit. [A settles with P. P v. B and C. A either remains in
the case as a named defendant or is impleaded by B or C.]
Case 4. Prior law. Plaintiff not negligent. Settling tortfeasor, B,
and C each negligent.
Plaintiff enters into a settlement agreement with A, whereby,
in exchange for the payment of $1,000, A is released from further
liability. Plaintiff sues B and C. B and C implead A and seek contri-
bution . 3 If the jury finds that A would have been liable to plaintiff
had plaintiff sued him, B's and C's contribution right against A is
established. That right, however, entitled them to no relief from A
directly, because the law wants to encourage settlements and A has
bought his peace. 4 Instead, B's and C's contribution right is effected
by diminishing the judgment in plaintiffs favor by 1/3, so that B
61. This assumption is seemingly required by the literal language of § 2(d) of article
2212a. Professor Dorsaneo doubts that the language was meant to be taken literally because
section 2(e) may have been intended to give the defendant the option to "implead" the settlor
even when settlement precedes litigation. See also Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
62. Another equally arbitrary assumption is explored in note 33 supra.
63. See note 56 supra.
64. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
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and C would be jointly and severally liable to plaintiff in the
amount of $6,666.67.11 This would be the result whether or not the
settlement agreement between plaintiff and A contained an under-
taking by plaintiff to indemnify and hold A harmless against any
assertion of liability by B or C. B's and C's contribution rights
between themselves are such that each should bear 1/2 of the net
liability to plaintiff, or $3,333.33 each.
Suppose that A had settled for $6,000, rather than $1,000, so
that the credit B and C would have received had they elected not
to implead A and seek contribution would have been greater than
the proportionate reduction. Can B and C elect the credit, rather
than the proportionate reduction? One recent decision has empha-
sized that the better view is that B and C, on impleading A and
showing that A was a joint tortfeasor, are entitled to the greater of
the proportionate reduction or the credit in the amount of the settle-
ment . 6
6
Suppose that B and C impleaded A, seeking proportionate-
reduction contribution, but were unable to establish that A was a
joint tortfeasor, or in some other respect failed to make a
substantive-law case for contribution. In that situation, B and C
would not get a proportionate reduction in their liability to plain-
tiff. However, there is no reason they should not be entitled to a
credit in the amount of the settlement, just as they were when they
chose not to implead A and seek contribution. The cases are in
conflict; several decisions appear to give no credit at all in this
situation 68
65. Id.
66. Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
67. Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ refd
n.r.e.); Skyline Cab Co. v. Bradley, 325 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
68. Some of the cases give the credit. See McMullen v. Coleman, 135 S.W.2d 776, 778
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, no writ); see also Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1079
(5th Cir. 1970). Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ),
implies that defendants should have the credit, claiming they are entitled in succeeding
in showing that the settlor was a joint tortfeasor to deduct the greater of the settlement
amount or a pro rata reduction. Some apparently do not. See Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977); Texaco, Inc. v. Pursley, 527 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Powell v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 396 F. Supp.
646 (E.D. Tex. 1975). None of the cases contain useful discussion of the point. It is discussed
in Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Cases-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
75, 82, 90 n.116 (1978). Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative Negligence:
Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 683 (1978),
assumes that the cases giving the credit state the correct rule.
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Case 4a. 2212a. Plaintiff not negligent. A's negligence, 50%;
B's, 30%; C's, 20%.
If it is determined that A, who settled for $1,000 and who was
impleaded by B and C, was a joint tortfeasor, then it is assumed
that A's percentage of negligence would also have to be determined.
Under section 2(e) of article 2212a, "the settlement is a complete
release of the portion of the judgment attributable to the percentage
of negligence found on the part of" the settling tortfeasor. Hence the
plaintiff would get a judgment against B and C, jointly and sever-
ally, for $5,000. B's and C's contribution rights between them-
selves-which must be determined in the main action-are such
that B's ultimate share of the liability would be $3,000 and C's,
$2,000. The commentators assume that B and C have to implead A
in order to assert their right to a percentage reduction of their liabil-
ity to plaintiff. The assumption is that article 2212a perpetuates the
ostensible requirement of prior law. 9
Suppose that A had settled for $6,000, rather than $1,000, so
that the credit B and C would have received ($6,000) had they
elected not to implead A and seek contribution would have been
greater than the percentage reduction ($5,000). The commentators
on article 2212a assume that B and C have the option to implead A
and to seek a determination of his percentage of negligence and a
corresponding reduction of their liability to plaintiff by that per-
centage of the total liability under section 2(e), or to refrain from
impleading A to seek a credit in the full amount of the settlement
under section 2(d).70 It is further assumed that B and C must make
69. A number of commentators, while deploring the requirement, assume that article
2212a perpetuates it in the language of §§ 2(d) and 2(e). Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas
Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1974); see also Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in
Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw.
L.J. 669, 684-86 (1978). See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ), which identifies the requirement as something of a charade that has been codified.
Id. at 423.
70. See Adams, Special Considerations for the Negligent Plaintiff Under Comparative
Negligence: Joinder of Defendants and the Feasibility of 100% Recovery, 11 TEx. TmAL LAW.
F. 7, 8-9 (1976); Fisher, Nugent, & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 662-66 (1974); see also Abraham & Riddle, Comparative
Negligence-A New Horizon, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 411, 418 (1973); Giessel & Giessel, Texas
Comparative Negligence Law, 8 TEx. TRIAL LAw. F. 14 (1973); Keeton, Annual Survey of
Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1974); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 83-84, 90 (1978); Comment, Multiple Party
Litigation in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement
Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 677, 681 (1978). See also Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
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the choice before submission of the case to the jury.7' Under this
reasoning, once a percentage of negligence has been determined for
the settling tortfeasor, the correct reduction of the remaining liabil-
ity is in that percentage, although the amount of the credit in the
settlement may have been greater."2
Suppose that B and C implead A, seeking a percentage reduc-
tion of their liability to plaintiff, but are unable to establish that A
was a joint tortfeasor, or in some other respect fail to make a
substantive-law case for contribution. Probably in that situation, B
and C should be entitled to the credit in the amount of the settle-
ment payment."
Case 4b. 2212a. Plaintiff's negligence, 20%; A's, 50%; B's, 20%;
C's, 10%.
Plaintiff's recovery against B and C is reduced by $2,000, repre-
senting his 20% negligence, and $5,000, representing A's 50% share
of the damages, for a total recovery of $3,000. B is jointly and sev-
erally liable for that amount, but C's liability is limited to $1,000.
B's and C's contribution shares are $2,000 and $1,000, respectively.
Interim Summary:
In Cases 3 and 4, A has bought his way out of the case, has
incurred no further liability to plaintiff, to B, or to C, and has
become a party to the action by plaintiff against B and C, if at all,
in only a nominal sense. However, it is essential to B's or C's asser-
tion of their contribution right-actually, against plaintiff but in
some peculiarly theoretical sense against A-that they implead him
as a third-party defendant.74 This technicality is foolish.7 1 There is
no intrinsic limit on the power of trial courts in Texas such that the
question of whether A is a joint tortfeasor-and if so, his percentage
of negligence-could not be determined without making him a party
to the lawsuit. 7 A more sensible approach would be to consider
71. See Fisher, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 13 TEX. TmuAL
LAW. F. 3, 11 (1979); See also Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ).
72. See Fisher, Nugent, & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 665-66 (1974); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 83 (1978). Compare Deal v. Madison, 576
S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ) (no opinion on that point); Comment,
Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and
Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 681 n.83 (1978)(contrary assumption).
73. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
74. See text and notes 59, 64-72 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 69 supra.
76. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (1978).
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settlement by one tortfeasor with the plaintiff as an affirmative
defense in the nature of payment.77 Under this analysis, if A is
shown to have been a joint tortfeasor, the judgment against B and
C is diminished. Under article 2212, the dimunition is 1/3; under
section 2(e) of article 2212a, on a finding that A's negligence was
50% of the total, the diminution is 1/2. On the other hand, if it is
determined that A was not a joint tortfeasor, or if B and C do not
choose to make that question part of the case, B and C should be
entitled to a credit in the amount A paid in settlement. Under 2212,
B and C would share equally in that credit. Under 2212a, section
2(d), "each defendant is entitled to deduct from the amount for
which he is liable to [plaintiff] a percentage of the amount of the
settlement based on the relationship the defendant's own negligence
bears to the total negligence of all defendants." In any case in which
the amount paid in settlement exceeded the pro rata or percentage
reduction allowable if A was a joint tortfeasor, B and C should
receive a credit in the amount of the settlement.
5. Contribution rights of putative tortfeasor who settled with
plaintiff. [A settles with plaintiff and then seeks contribution from
B and C.]
Case 5. Prior law. Plaintiff not negligent. Settling tortfeasor, B,
and C are negligent.
Plaintiff enters into a settlement agreement with A whereby, in
exchange for A's payment of $6,000, A is released from further liabil-
ity. A then asserts a contribution right against B and C. Most au-
thorities indicate that A does not have that right; one who settles
with plaintiff for less than the full value of the claim has no contri-
bution rights against other putative tortfeasors.5
Had A settled for $10,000, which was the full value of plaintiff's
claim,7" A would have conribution rights against B and C, which he
77. See note 69 supra. See also Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1978, no writ).
78. See Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 27-28 n.24 (S.D. Tex.
1968); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 75, 77, 80, 89 (1978). But see Friedman v. Martini Tile & Terrazzo Co., 298
S.W.2d 221, 226-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1957, no writ) (indicating that a partial settlor
may sometimes have contribution rights); William Cameron & Co. v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d
307 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Comment, Multiple Party Litiga-
tion in Comparative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems,
32 Sw. L.J. 669, 679 n.74 (1978).
79. For discussion of the circumstances under which a settlement with one party has
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could assert either by bringing a separate contribution suit or by
cross-action in the main lawsuit. 0 The issue in that situation would
be whether A merely made a voluntary settlement payment-in
which event most cases indicate that no contribution would be
available8 1-or whether the payment was made pursuant to some
arrangement that would qualify as a "judgment" within the lan-
guage of article 2212.82 If A could meet that requirement and could
further show that he, B, and C were joint tortfeasors and that the
settlement was prudent and reasonable, he would be entitled to
contribution of 1/3 each from B and C.
Case 5a. 2212a. Plaintiff not negligent. A's negligence, 50%; B's,
30%; C's, 20%.
Article 2212a has nothing to say about a lawsuit brought by a
settling tortfeasor against others seeking contribution. The com-
mentators have assumed that article 2212 continues to govern that
situation.8
Case 5b. 2212a. Plaintiffs negligence, 20%; A's, 50%; B's, 20%;
C's, 10%.
No difference.
satisfied plaintiff's entire claim, see Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Contro-
versies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 76-79 (1978).
80. A might be a party to that lawsuit as a named defendant, whom plaintiff did not
dismiss after settlement; as a third-party defendant, whom the others had impleaded; or as
intervenor. See note 91 infra.
81. See Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 25-31 (S.D. Tex. 1968);
Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
75, 76 n.7 (1978). But see William Cameron & Co. v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors, 26 TExAS L. REV. 150, 168 (1947); Comment, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 326, 332 (1965). The latter three authorities suggest that a
putative tortfeasor should be able to make a voluntary settlement payment and then seek
contribution, without the necessity of paying under a "judgment." It has also been suggested
that the settling tortfeasor who does not pay under a judgment can pursue the other tortfea-
sors if he takes an assignment of the victim's cause of action against them. See Bradshaw v.
Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703, 704 (1935); Friedman v. Martini Tile & Terrazzo
Co., 298 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1957, no writ).
82. For discussion of what arrangements qualify as "judgments," see Traveler's Ins. Co.
v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 25-31 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Comment, Settlements in Multiple
Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 80 (1978).
83. Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies- Texas Law, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 75, 85 (1978). But see Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Comparative




6. Indemnity rights of named defendants against putative tort-
feasor who settled with plaintiff. [A settles with P. P v. B and C.
B and C assert indemnity right against A.]
Case 6. Prior law.
A settles with plaintiff for $1,000. Plaintiff sues B and C. B and
C implead A asserting a right to indemnity." The trial court deter-
mines that B and C have an indemnity right against A. 85 The cases
are not clear on the appropriate resolution, but there is support for
three different propositions.
The first proposition is that B and C are jointly and severally
liable to plaintiff for $9,000, but they are entitled to indemnification
from A for that amount.86 Under this resolution, the settlement
agreement A made with plaintiff fails to protect A from B's and C's
indemnity right. Second, the settlement agreement protects A from
any further liability, and B and C lose their right to sue A. 7 Third,
the settlement agreement protects A from further liability, but B
and C can enforce their indemnity right against plaintiff.88 The third
resolution is easier to reach if the settlement agreement between A
84. Arguably, B and C could have asserted their indemnity right without making A a
party to the lawsuit. See Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ); Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
85. Texas law is quite unclear on the substantive question, what gives rise to a tort right
to indemnity of one tortfeasor by another. See discussions of that point in General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859-61 (Tex. 1977); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548
S.W.2d 416, 427-28 (Tex. Civ. App.- Corpus Christi 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978); Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 165-66 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Friedman v. Martini Tile & Terrazzo Co., 298 S.W.2d
221, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1957, no writ); Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248
S.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Traveler's Ins.
Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 19-23 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Keeton, Annual Survey of
Texas Law-Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1978); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tort-
feasor Controversies- Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 85 (1978).
86. Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 75, 86 n.94 (1978), citing Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 784-
85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for this resolution. In that case, however,
the plaintiff took nothing from a defendant held entitled to indemnity from settlor because
plaintiff had agreed to indemnify settlor and there was no point in pursuing that circle. It is
not clear what the court would have done had there been no indemnity agreement between
plaintiff and settlor. 248 S.W.2d at 784-85.
87. Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies- Texas Law, 10 ST.
MARY's L.J. 75, 86 n.95 (1978), citing Frantom v. Neal, 426 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Ft. Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for this proposition. As acknowledged by the author,
however, the case is equivocal on the point.
88. Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 784-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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and plaintiff contains an agreement by plaintiff to indemnify A and
to protect him against a contribution or indemnity claim by B or
C. 81 There is authority for this proposition, even when there is no
agreement." The logic of the third resolution is that to encourage
settlements, which protects A from further liability and to give B
and C an indemnity right, can only be accomplished by foreclosing
the plaintiff from recovery.
Case 6a. and 6b. 2212a.
Nothing in the language of article 2212a, the commentary, or
the cases speaks to the alternative resolutions posed for Case 6.
7. Indemnity rights of putative tortfeasor who settled with plain-
tiff. [A settles with P. P v. B and C. A asserts right to indemnity
against B and C.]
Case 7. Prior law.
A settles with plaintiff. Plaintiff sues B and C, who unsuccess-
fully assert a contribution right against A or who fail to implead A
and assert their right. Judgment is rendered for plaintiff against B
and C, jointly and severally. A then asserts a right to indemnifica-
tion by B or C. This right may be asserted in the main lawsuit or in
a separate action." There is no requirement-as there was in Case
5, in which A settled and then sought contribution-that the settle-
ment be for the full value of the claim, that it be court-approved,
or that it amount to a "judgment." 2 A can establish his right to
indemnification from B or C by showing that A had potential liabil-
ity to plaintiff, 3 that the settlement was reasonable and prudent
89. See note 86 supra.
90. See Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 150,
172 (1947).
91. In the following cases the settling tortfeasor asserted his right to indemnification
as intervenor or cross-claimant in the main action. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978); see also
Powell v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 396 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tex. 1975). In other cases, the
settling tortfeasor brought a lawsuit seeking indemnification. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex. 1972); William Cameron & Co. v.
Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.). In two
cases, the settling tortfeasor took an assignment of the victim's rights against the others and
pursued an indemnification claim via that route. Friedman v. Martini Tile & Terrazzo Co.,
298 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1957, no writ); see Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
United States 283 F. Supp. 14, 19 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
92. See authorities cited in note 91 supra.
93. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 430 S.W.2d 900, 904-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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under the circumstances, and that he can meet the test for indem-
nification under substantive tort principles.9'
Case 7a. and 7b. 2212a.
Probably the separate indemnification suit, like the separate
contribution suit, is not affected by article 2212a.
Interim Summary:
When a putative joint tortfeasor settles with plaintiff and then
seeks contribution, the cases imply that he must arrange the settle-
ment to be equivalent to a "judgment." Further, it is probable that
the settlement must discharge the full claim rather than a portion
of it. Neither of these requirements exists when the settling tort-
feasor is seeking indemnity rather than contribution. The distinc-
tion is without basis in reason or policy, yet the cases seem to sup-
port it. The correct resolution of the matter is to enable a tortfeasor
who settles all or a part of a claim to assert contribution rights or
indemnity rights against the other tortfeasor in either the main or
a separate lawsuit. He would be entitled to recovery of contribution
on showing that he was potentially liable to plaintiff, that the settle-
ment was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, that the
others were joint tortfeasors, and that he had discharged more than
his fair share of the liability. He would be entitled to indemnifica-
tion on showing that he was potentially liable to the plaintiff, that
the settlement was reasonable and prudent under the circumstan-
ces, and that he has a substantive right to indemnity against the
other tortfeasors.
Another problem in section 2 of article 2212a is subsection (f),
which provides for offset. If at the conclusion of a two-party litiga-
tion A is liable to B for $10,000 and B is liable to A for $5,000, then
B will recover $5,000 from A. This section of the statute, which
protects liability insurers, has been called its "most objectionable
feature." 5 The offset can create potentially complicated calcula-
tions by the trial judge in a multi-party case." The commentators
have assumed that the offset calculation is to be made on the basis
of the parties' post-contribution share of the liability determined in
94. See Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas Law, 10
ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 86 (1978); see also note 85 supra.
95. Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 12 (1974). See McGuire
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968), which may imply no offset in
Texas law before 2212a.
96. See, e.g., Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1974).
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the case, ignoring the joint and several liability feature. 7 However,
the statute does not imply that this is the correct method of deter-
mining the parties ultimate responsibilities, and other methods of
making the calculation that achieve different outcomes are also
supportable under the statute's language.
The choices can be clarified by the following hypothetical."8 A,
B, and C are all negligent, and each is damaged in a traffic accident.
The damages of each party are single, indivisible and unapportiona-
ble. Each sues the other two for his damages; each defends and
cross-claims against the others for contribution. The jury finds: A,
30% negligent, $80,000 damages; B, 40% negligent, $100,000 dam-
ages; C, 30% negligent, $60,000 damages.9 On these findings, the
consolidated lawsuit can be depicted as follows:
Table 1
A v. B C
$56,000 $32,000 $24,000 post-contribution shares, section 2(b).
$56,000 $56,000 each defendant jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount awarded
plaintiff, section 2(c).
B v. A C
$60,000 $30,000 $30,000 post-contribution shares, section 2(b).
$30,000 $30,000 neither defendant jointly and severally
liable, section 2(c).
C v. A B
$42,000 $18,000 $24,000 post-contribution shares, section 2(b).
$42,000 $42,000 each defendant jointly and severally
liable, section 2(c).
Figuring the offset on the basis of the parties' post-contribution
shares of the liability, the determination is:
97. See id. at 12-13; see also Abraham, Proposed Texas Modified Comparative Negli-
gence Statute: Its Operation and Effect, 35 TEx. B.J. 1114, 1115 (1972); Fisher, Nugent, &
Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 665, 672-
73 (1974); Giessel & Giessel, Texas Comparative Negligence Law, 8 TEX. TAL LAw. F., 12,
17-19 (1973).
98. Borrowed from Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 12-13
(1974).
99. This hypothetical is borrowed from Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts,
28 Sw. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1974).
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B owes A $32,000; A owes B $30,000; B pays A $2,000.
C owes A $24,000; A owes C $18,000; C pays A $6,000.
C owes B $30,000; B owes C $24,000; C pays B $6,000.
Note that this calculation shifts only $14,000 of a total $240,000 loss.
One could figure the offset in several different ways, each of
which seems to yield different results. For example, the lawsuit A
v. B and C yielded a determination that B was liable to A for $56,000
with C owing B $24,000 in contribution. Similarly, the lawsuit C v.
A and B determined that A was liable to C for $42,000, with B owing
A $24,000 in contribution. Under those two interpretations, the off-
set calculation would be:
B owes A $56,000 + $24,000 (A as cross-claimant for contribu-
tion), for a total of $80,000; A owes B $30,000. B pays A $50,000.
C owes A $0; A owes C $42,000. A pays C $42,000.
C owes B $30,000 + $24,000 (contribution), for a total of
$54,000; B owes C $0. C pays B $54,000.
Other permutations are possible. The assumption made in the liter-
ature-that the offset is correctly figured against the parties' post-
contribution share-is only the simplest.' °"
Summary of Part I:
The major changes effected by article 2212a on the respective
rights and liabilities of multiple tortfeasors are the following:
(1) All claims for contribution among named defendants and
by named defendants against non-party tortfeasors who have set-
tled with plaintiff must be determined in the "primary" or main
lawsuit.
(2) Defendants' post-contribution shares of the total liability
to plaintiff are determined according to their percentage of negli-
gence.
(3) When a tortfeasor settles with plaintiff but is not made a
party to the primary lawsuit, for which reason the percentage of his
negligence is not found, the defendants are entitled to a credit in
the total amount of the settlement, apportioned among the defen-
dants according to each defendant's share of the total defendant
negligence found in the case.
(4) When a tortfeasor settles with plaintiff, but is nevertheless
100. The only reported decision treating the offset feature is Willingham v. Hagerty,
553 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). It does not address the questions
under consideration.
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"joined as a party defendant at the time of the submission of the
case to the jury,"'01 the non-settled defendants are entitled to a
determination of whether the settling defendant was a joint tortfea-
sor, and, if so, what the settling defendant's percentage of the total
negligence was. The settlement is a complete release of the settling
defendant's percentage of the total liability.
A number of significant questions have not been resolved:
(1) What is the impact of 2212a on the rule that third-party
actions for contribution are viewed as distinct and severable contro-
versies such that venue of third-party actions must be determined
independently?
(2) When named defendants implead a non-settlingtortfeasor
for contribution, is the third-party defendant's percentage of negli-
gence submitted to the jury?
(3) Is it necessary to bring a third-party action for contribu-
tion or indemnity in order to have a settling tortfeasor's negligence
submitted to the jury?
(4) Are named defendants entitled to implead a settling tort-
feasor solely for the purpose of taking advantage of section 2(e) of
article 2212a?
(5) Is a lawsuit brought by a tortfeasor or tortfeasors, who
have paid a judgment or who have settled with plaintiff, seeking
contribution from other (putative) tortfeasors governed by 2212a, or
does 2212 continue to control?
(a) If 2212 controls, do the paying tortfeasors, if successful in
their subsequent suit for contribution, share equally in the contribu-
tion award, or do they share in accordance with their respective
percentages of negligence?'
(b) If 2212a controls, what is the res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect of the negligence percentage findings made in the
first lawsuit?
(6) Are named defendants, unsuccessful in an attempt to
show that a person who settled with plaintiff was a tortfeasor, enti-
tled to a credit against their liability to the plaintiff in the amount
of the settlement?
(7) Are named defendants, successful in showing that a per-
son who settled with plaintiff was a joint tortfeasor, entitled to a
credit in the amount of the settlement when that is a larger amount
than the settling tortfeasor's percentage share of total liability?
101. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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Part II of this article will address these questions and will rec-
ommend solutions.
II.
The principal thrust of the recommendations made is toward
reducing the number of judicial proceedings and determinations
that must be made before multi-party tort litigation is fully re-
solved. It should be possible to design a system whereby no more
than one lawsuit is necessary to resolve all the rights and liabilities
of the parties in the typical situation involving a single, indivisible
injury. 0 2
Recommendation 1. Named defendants should be required to
assert contribution or indemnity rights against other putative tort-
feasors who have not settled with plaintiff by impleading them in
the primary lawsuit regardless of whether they have been sued by
the plaintiff.
Discussion: Section 2(g) of article 2212a provides that: "All
claims for contribution between named defendants in the primary
suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a named
defendant may proceed against a person not a party to the primary
suit who has not effected a settlement with the claimant."' 1 This
subsection has been construed as a special venue exception. 10 How-
ever, the important question is whether the subsection overrides
prior law to the effect that venue of a third-party action is deter-
mined independently. 05
In Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, ' a truck collided with a bus.
Plaintiff, a bus passenger, was hurt. Although the collision occurred
in Live Oak County, plaintiff sued the bus owner in Cameron
102. Much of the commentary urges a single lawsuit as a goal. See, e.g., Adams, Special
Considerations for the Negligent Plaintiff Under Comparative Negligence: Joinder of Defen-
dants and the Feasibility of 100% Recovery, 11 TEx. TRIAL LAw. F., 7, 8 (1976); Keeton,
Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 11 (1974).
103. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979)(emphasis
added).
104. Chaney v. Coleman Co., 567 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ);
Southwestern Eng'r Corp. v. Phillips, 566 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no
writ); Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd); Winningham v. Connor, 552 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ); LaSorsa v. Burr, 516 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Edwards, 512
S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
105. See Tax. R. Cwr. P. 38(d)("This rule shall not be applied so as to violate any venue
statute, as venue would exist absent this rule.").
106. 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774 (1944).
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County. Venue was sustainable in Cameron County on the basis of
subdivision 24 of article 199510 because the bus line operated as a
common carrier in Cameron County and had an agent there. Plain-
tiffs did not sue the truck owner. The bus owner brought a third-
party action against the truck owner. The truck owner filed a plea
of privilege.'0 At the venue hearing, the bus owner contended that
the truck owner was a "necessary party" within the meaning of
subdivision 29a of article 1995.'09 The Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded that, although "it would be more convenient to try the con-
troversy among all the parties in a single suit,""' subdivision 29a did
not apply because there was only one third-party defendant. More-
over, because a separate action for contribution could be filed, the
third-party action was distinct and severable."'
It has been suggested that article 2212a overrules Union Bus
Lines. 12 It is difficult to sustain this suggestion in light of the lan-
guage of section 2(g) of article 2212a. Although there are now a
number of cases which have construed section 2(g), Chaney v. The
Coleman Company, Inc."' illustrates the problem nicely. Plaintiff
brought a negligence action against Coleman, but did not name
Chaney as a defendant. Coleman brought a third-party action
against Chaney, who filed a plea of privilege. Coleman contended
that venue of the third-party action was proper under section 2(g)
of article 2212a and subdivision 29a of article 1995. With respect to
section 2(g), the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the
language of the first clause of the section was not applicable because
Chaney was not one of the "named defendants in the primary
suit.""' With respect to Coleman's contention that subdivision 29a
applied, the court cited Union Bus Lines for the proposition that a
third-party action is a distinct and severable cause of action. On the
107. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (24) (Vernon 1964) (Carriers).
108. TEx. R. Civ. P. 86.
109. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (29a) (Vernon 1964) ("Two or more defend-
ants. Whenever there are two or more defendants in any suit brought in any county in this
State and such suit is lawfully maintainable therein under the provisions of Article 1995 as
to any of such defendants, then suit suit may be maintained in such county against any and
all necessary parties thereto.").
110. 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1944).
111. 177 S.W.2d at 776.
112. Hoixjas, JONES, & ELoTr, Tim JuDIcIAL Paocass PRioR To TRIAL IN TEXAs 395 (2d
ed. 1977); Fisher, Nugent, & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice,
5 ST. MARY's L.J. 655, 666-70 (1974).
113. 567 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
114. Id. at 883.
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basis of the statutory language, it is difficult to quarrel with the
result reached."5 On the other hand, it is difficult to justify the
statutory language. Venue of the contribution claim should not de-
pend upon whether the "defendant" from whom contribution is
sought is a party named by the plaintiff in the primary suit"6 re-
gardless of whether the contribution share of the third-party defen-
dant is computed in accordance with article 2212 or section 2(b) of
article 2212a.17 Therefore, it is recommended that section 2(g) be
amended to provide the following:
All cross-claims and third-party actions for contribution or in-
demnity are compulsory claims which must be asserted in connec-
tion with the primary suit by named defendants against each other
and by named defendants against persons not parties to the pri-
mary suit who are amenable to process and who have not effected
a settlement with the claimant. Venue of the foregoing cross-
actions is proper where the primary suit is maintained. A third-
party defendant who is not amenable to process may be sued in a
separate action.
Recommendation 2. " The percentage of negligence of a nonset-
tling tortfeasor should be submitted to the jury when he is made a
third-party defendant. The percentage finding should be used only
to compute contribution shares unless plaintiff also names the
third-party defendant as defendant in the primary suit.
Discussion: The choice here is an important one when the
plaintiff is guilty of negligence, because if the percentage of negli-
gence of the third-party defendant is submitted and considered in
computing plaintiff's recovery from the named defendants, the per-
centage finding should increase the liability of named defendants
who are more negligent than the plaintiff but decrease the liability
of named defendants who are less negligent than the plaintiff. More-
over, when a tortfeasor is insolvent, submission of his percentage of
negligence may have unfortunate consequences for plaintiff. Con-
sider the following hypothetical: Plaintiff's negligence, 20%; A's,
60%; B's, 10%; C's, 10%; Damages, $10,000. If A is not joined by the
115. It could be argued that the holding of Union Bus Lines is incompatible with
comparative negligence and that when § 2(g) uses the language "primary suit" it means the
lawsuit in which the contribution claim is first asserted. This reading of the statutory lan-
guage is too tortuous to be satisfying.
116. See Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1974).
117. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
118. This is the recommendation of Professor Dorsaneo.
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plaintiff because he is insolvent, but A's percentage is submitted,
determined and used to calculate the amount of plaintiff's recovery,
plaintiff bears the consequences of A's insolvency because plaintiff's
negligence percentage is greater than the percentage attributable to
each defendant named by plaintiff. Consequently, neither B nor C
is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. However, under sec-
tion 2(c), each is liable for his percentage share. Hence, on the
foregoing hypothetical, plaintiff would recover only $1,000 from B
and $1,000 from C. However, if the percentage of negligence of either
B or C is equal to or greater than the percentage of negligence of the
plaintiff, B or C, rather than the plaintiff, will bear the brunt of
A's insolvency. Recovery will be reduced only on the basis of the
plaintiff's percentage of negligence.' For example, assume the fol-
lowing: Plaintiff's negligence, 10%; A's, 60%; B's, 15%; C's, 15%;
Damages, $10,000. B -and C are jointly and severally liable for
$9,000. They have a theoretical right to contribution from A. But if
A is insolvent, B and C bear the brunt of his insolvency.
Assume the percentage of A's negligence is not submitted and
the jury finds as follows: Plaintiff, 50%; B, 25%; C, 25%; Damages,
$10,000. Plaintiff would recover $2,500 each from B and C, $3,000
more than if A's percentage of negligence were submitted and taken
into account in determining the liability of the primary defendants.
In effect, on the assumption that blameworthiness ratios are pre-
served, the non-submission of A's percentage of negligence has re-
sulted in a division of the burden of A's insolvency among the par-
ties in proportion to their respective percentages of negligence. Al-
though this method seems fair on principle to both the plaintiff and
the named defendants, it creates a problem with respect to the
determination of contribution shares when the tortfeasor not sued
by plaintiff is solvent. If A's percentage of negligence is not submit-
ted, section 2(b) could not be employed in determining B's and C's
contribution rights against A. Hence, the matter apparently would
be governed by article 2212. Only the fact (not the percentage) of
A's negligence would be submitted to the jury. If A were found to
be a tortfeasor, B and C would be entitled to a one-third contribu-
tion share (or $1,666.67) from A, which B and C would presumably
share equally.1 20 If A were insolvent-presumably the usual situa-
119. TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
120. It could be argued that B's and C's right to A's 1/3 contribution would be deter-
mined according to their percentages of negligence, using article 2212a, § 2(d) as the appropri-
ate analogy. However, we believe that if it is decided that A's percentage of negligence is not
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tion; otherwise, plaintiff would have sued A-there would be no
contribution as a practical matter. If A were solvent at the time of
judgment, B's and C's liability to plaintiff would be $2,500 apiece,
and each could only obtain contribution from A for approximately
$833.34. B and C are in a worse position than if highly culpable A
had been sued by plaintiff and A's percentage of negligence submit-
ted. This seems unfair on principle.
There is, however, at least one other method that could be
employed to resolve the problem. Assume that A's percentage of
negligence is submitted but that it is not considered in determining
anything other than the extent of contribution shares. For example,
assume the findings are:
P-20%; A-60%; B-10%; C-10%; Damages, $10,000.
If the trial court compares only the negligence of plaintiff and B and
C in determining plaintiff's aggregate recovery, the amount for
which B and C will be liable to plaintiff will be the same regardless
of whether A's negligence is submitted. In other words, because
plaintiffs negligence is not greater than the negligence of B and C,
without regard to A's percentage, by focusing on only the parties to
the primary lawsuit (plaintiffs action), the result is a reduction of
plaintiffs recovery to $5,000; $2,500 each from B and C. This is the
same result as when A's percentage is not submitted. However, this
approach creates difficulty in other cases. Consider the following
findings:
P-20%; A-70%; B-5%; C-5%; Damages, $10,000.
If A is treated as a "person or party" within the meaning of section
1 of article 2212a, plaintiff can still recover $500 from B and $500
from C. On the other hand, if A's negligence is used only to deter-
mine contribution shares, the plaintiff recovers nothing because the
negligence of B and C in the aggregate is less than plaintiffs negli-
gence. Of course, an exception could be made to permit recovery.
In terms of the determination of contribution shares, the proce-
dure would be to compare the percentages of negligence of tortfea-
sors named by the plaintiff and those not named. The following
method would be used. Assume the facts of the basic hypothetical
as follows:
P-20%; A-60%; B-10%; C-10%; Damages, $10,000.
If P sued A, P would be entitled to a judgment for $8,000. Based on
to be submitted to the jury, contribution against A is best governed entirely by article 2212.
Hence, we would suggest an equal split. Here, of course, the point is moot, as B's and C's
negligence percentages are the same.
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the method of computation discussed above, when A is not sued,
plaintiff recovers $5,000 in the aggregate. A's negligence is 75% of
the negligence of all tortfeasors. In theory A would have a contribu-
tion share equal to 75% of the judgment of $8,000 ($6,000). The
difference between the amount the plaintiff could have recovered
from A, B, and C, if all were sued, and the amount recoverable from
B is, therefore, $3,000. This amount should be subtracted from the
$6,000 (representing A's theoretical contribution share) in order
to obtain the amount of contribution that B and C are entitled to
receive from A. The amount then should be divided in proportion
to their respective percentages of negligence. The net result is as
follows:
(a) B is liable to plaintiff for $2,500 with a $1,500 contribution
from A, leaving B with $1,000 worth of responsibility if A is solvent.
(b) C is liable to plaintiff for $2,500 with a $1,500 contribution
from A, leaving C with $1,000 worth of responsibility if A is solvent.
This solution avoids two problems. First, assuming A is solvent, it
reaches the same end result as the view under which a third-party
defendant is treated as a defendant named by the plaintiff. Second,
if A is not solvent, the parties, plaintiff and defendant share the
brunt of A's insolvency in proportion to their percentages of negli-
gence. Another hypothetical demonstrates the difference between
the methods. Assume the following:
P-20%; A-20%; B-30%; C-30%; Damages, $10,000.
If plaintiff sued all tortfeasors, all would be jointly and severally
liable for $8,000. If plaintiff sued B and C, they would be jointly and
severally liable. Under the prevailing view, A is treated as if plaintiff
sued him. Consequently, A's percentage is submitted, and B and C
are jointly and severally liable for $8,000. If A's percentage is not
submitted and assuming the jury made the same comparative fault
determinations for plaintiff and B and C, the percentage findings
would be:
P-25%; B-37 /2%; C-37 /2%; Damages, $10,000.
Under these findings, plaintiff would recover $7,500 jointly and sev-
erally from B and C. Under the article 2212 method of determining
the contribution share of A, the questions of negligence and proxi-
mate cause would be submitted to determine whether A was a tort-
feasor. If answered affirmatively, A's contribution share would be
$2,500.121
121. Note that A's contribution share exceeds by $500 the maximum contribution lia-
bility he would have incurred if he had been sued by the plaintiff..
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Under the method recommended, the amount of plaintiff's ag-
gregate recovery from B and C would be the same as under the
second method, or $7,500. The key difference is in determining the
amount of A's contribution. For example, assume again the jury
finds the following:
P-20%; A-20%; B-30%; C-30%; Damages, $10,000.
By considering the comparison between the percentage finding of
plaintiff's negligence and the negligence of B and C so that the
percentages are rounded to 100%, each of B and C is one and one-
half times as negligent as plaintiff such that the percentages are:
P-25%; B-37 1/2%; and C-37 1/2%.
Hence, plaintiff recovers $7,500 from B and C jointly and sever-
ally. But instead of proportionately setting A's contribution share,
a comparison is based upon the relationship of A's negligence to the
negligence of B and C. Assuming all tortfeasors are solvent, A's
contribution share would be calculated by taking 20% of plaintiff's
damages. If the $500 representing the difference (between the
amount A, B and C would have been adjudged liable to pay plain-
tiff, $8,000, and the amount of plaintiff's recovery from B and C,
$7,500) is subtracted from the $2,000 (A's hypothetical contribution
share) in order to obtain the total amount of contribution recovera-
ble by B and C from A, the result is as follows:
(a) B is liable to plaintiff for $7,500 with a $1,500 contribution
right from A and a $3,000 contribution from C.
(b) C is liable to plaintiff for $7,500 with a $1,500 contribution
right from A and a $3,000 contribution from B.
In other words, if A, B, and C all pay their appropriate share, A pays
$1,500, B pays $3,000, and C pays $3,000. On the other hand, if A
is insolvent such that, as a practical matter, he pays nothing, the
brunt of his insolvency is shared in proportion to the respective
percentages of negligence of the plaintiff and the persons named as
defendants by the plaintiff.
Alternative Recommendation 2.122 The percentage of negligence
of a non-settling tortfeasor not sued by plaintiff but impleaded by
named defendants, should not be submitted to the jury.
Discussion: As explained above, this choice is extremely diffi-
cult because the consequences of non-submission influence the
amount that plaintiff will recover when plaintiff is guilty of some
negligence. The basis for concluding that it is better not to submit
122. This is the recommendation of Professor Robertson.
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the percentage of negligence of the third-party defendant is that
plaintiff should have the choice of suing whomever he chooses. In
accordance with section 1 of article 2212a,'1 plaintiff should recover
if plaintiff's "negligence is not greater than the negligence of the
person or party or persons or parties against whom recovery is
sought. . .. ."1
This recommendation can be illustrated as follows: Suppose
that plaintiff sued B and C, who implead A-who has not settled
with plaintiff-for contribution. Assuming that the percentage of
negligence of A is submitted to the jury, the jury would assess plain-
tiff's negligence at 40%; A's at 30%; B's at 20%; and C's at 10%.115
Under section 2(c) of article 2212a, none of these defendants-each
of whose negligence is less than plaintiff's-would be liable to plain-
tiff beyond his percentage of negligence; there is no joint and several
liability for the whole amount of plaintiff's judgment. Hence, A
would owe plaintiff $3,000, B, $2,000, and C, $1,000. If A were insol-
vent, plaintiff would bear the loss of A's $3,000 share, recovering
only $3,000 from B and C together. B and C would have forced that
resolution on plaintiff by impleading A and having A's negligence
submitted to the jury. In effect, B and C would have effected their
contribution rights by forcing an insolvent tortfeasor on the plain-
tiff.
Hence, unless plaintiff joined A as defendant, the jury should
not determine A's percentage of negligence, but only A's liability to
plaintiff. If the jury answers that A would have been liable to the
plaintiff, B and C should share equally in the contribution award
against A in the amount of 1/3 of the total amount awarded plain-
tiff. Plaintiff's rights against B and C would be unaffected by the
contribution action. Of course, in this situation the jury's determi-
nation of the percentages of negligence of plaintiff, B, and C would
be different than in the three-defendant situation, and plaintiff
could lose any right to recover against B and C if his negligence were
51% or more of the total.' 26 If the jury in the case of P v. B and C
were consistent with the hypothetical given in their assessment of
the parties' relative fault, they would hold plaintiff guilty of 4/7 of
the negligence, B of 2/7, and C of 1/7.' This, of course, means that
123. T x. Riv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
124. Id.
125. See note 10 supra.
126. Id. art. 2212a, § 1.
127. See note 123 supra. This amounts to redistributing A's "missing" 30% of the
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plaintiff is not entitled to recovery'n and that he would have been
in an improved situation had he joined the insolvent A as defen-
dant.2" But the plaintiff should have that choice, not the defen-
dants.
Recommendation 3. It should not be necessary to join a settling
party as a third-party defendant.
Discussion: Most of the commentators have hesitantly agreed
that defendants must implead a settling tortfeasor in order to assert
contribution rights against him. 30 Because defendants have no
rights that actually run against the settling tortfeasor, there is no
reason to require that the settling tortfeasor be a party to the law-
suit. (If a defendant settled during the litigation, he should be dis-
missed from the case.) Defendant's rights to "contribution" that
arise-from the settling tortfeasor's existence actually run against the
plaintiff; those rights should be asserted as affirmative defenses.
The question whether a settling tortfeasor should be made a party
to plaintiff's lawsuit against other tortfeasors is independent of
questioning what the remaining defendants' contribution or in-
demnity rights should be. As has been pointed out,'3' nothing pre-
vents a court from making a determination that a non-party was
negligent and from making a concomitant determination of that
person's percentage of negligence in order to determine the remain-
ing defendants' contribution rights. 32 However, section 2(e) of arti-
cle 2212a does not require this "charade."
Recommendation 4. Defendants who establish that a settling
tortfeasor would have owed them indemnity should have no liability
to plaintiff.
Discussion: This proposal probably maintains the status quo, 3
negligence among the parties in proportion to their blameworthiness. The three-defendant
findings were:
P v.A B C
40% 30% 20% 10%




128. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
129. See art. 2212(a), §§ 2(b), 2(c).
130. See notes 56, 69, 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
132. Under recommendations 5 and 6 it would not be necessary to determine a settling
party's percentage of negligence. But the recommendations are not interdependent.
133. See notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text.
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but the policy of encouraging settlement by protecting the settling
tortfeasor from further liability should hold. The remaining tortfea-
sors should not lose their indemnity rights because of an agreement
to which they were not a party. The plaintiff had the choice to settle
with the party from whom indemnity was owed.
Taking into account the confusing state of substantive law on
the question of when indemnity is owing, 13' the proposal to abolish
tort indemnity in most instances is appealing.Ili
Recommendation 5. Unless there is a right to indemnity from
the settling tortfeasor, defendants who succeed in establishing that
the plaintiff has received an amount in settlement would be entitled
to a credit against their liability to plaintiff in that amount. This
right would exist without reference to whether the settling party was
liable to the plaintiff. Only in a relatively infrequent situation of a
settlement between plaintiff and a defendant during jury delibera-
tions or after the verdict would there by any determination of a
settling party's percentage of negligence.
Discussion: This controversial proposal recommends restoring
Texas law to the status quo ante of the 1964 decision in Palestine
Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins. It recommends handling virtually all
settlement situations according to the provisions of section 2(d) of
article 2212a, with section 2(e) coming into play only when a named
defendant settled with plaintiff during jury deliberations or after
verdict.'37
Palestine has been the definitive essay on contribution rights
in settlement situations. Plaintiff settled with and released one pu-
tative tortfeasor for a consideration of $10. The question was
whether the defendant could assert a right to contribution against
the settling party. The court thought each of three competing reso-
lutions was meritorious: (1) credit in the amount of settlement,
defendant retaining the right to pursue the settling party for contri-
bution; (2) credit in the amount of settlement, defendant having no
right to contribution; (3) defendant entitled to reduce his liability
to plaintiff by 1/2 on showing that the settling party was a joint
tortfeasor.'1 The court rejected the first resolution because leaving
134. See note 85 supra.
135. Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 13 (1978).
136. 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
137. Dean Keeton argues that § 2(e) should virtually always govern. Keeton, Annual
Survey of Texas Law-Torts, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1974).
138. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1964).
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the settling party open to contribution liability would discourage
settlements.Iu It rejected the second because article 2212 provided
a "right" to contribution that could not be defeated by a settle-
ment."40 Hence, it adopted the third resolution. The court recog-
nized that the 1955 Uniform Contribution Act"' and a majority of
the states had adopted the second resolution."2 The third resolution
was in a minority. It had been discussed briefly in the dictum of a
1932 commission of appeals decision."3 The principal argument in
its favor, was the view that article 2212, granting a "substantive
right'"" to contribution, precluded the adoption of the Uniform Act
resolution.
With the passage of article 2212a, the article 2212 impediment
to adopting the most practical resolution of the settlement problem
was removed. Section 2 of article 2212a "prevails over Article 2212
I .. , and all other laws to the extent of any conflict.""15 Section 2(d)
of article 2212a provides for a method of crediting the judgment with
the amount of the settlement:
If an alleged tort-feasor pays an amount to a claimant in set-
tlement, but is never joined as a party defendant, or having been
joined, is dismissed or nonsuited after settlement with the claim-
ant (for which reason the existence and amount of his negligence
are not submitted to the jury), each defendant is entitled to deduct
from the amount for which he is liable to the claimant a percentage
of the amount of the settlement based on the relationship the
defendant's own negligence bears to the total negligence of all
defendants. 141
Section 2(e) provides the alternate method:
139. Id.
140. Id. at 767, 771.
141. The 1939 Uniform Act provided for a proportionate reduction, as did the resolution
adopted by the Palestine Contractors opinion. The Uniform Act was changed in 1955 to
provide for credit because of problems with the proportionate reduction solution. Palestine
Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 768-71 (Tex. 1960).
142. Id. at 769-70.
143. Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005, 1006-07 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932,
holding approved); see generally Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors,
26 TEXAS L. Rzv. 150 (1947); Note, Procedure--Torts-Covenant Not To Sue One of Several
Joint Tortfeasors Reduces Total Recoverable Damages by Only the Amount Paid For It, 43
TEXAS L. Rav. 118 (1964).
144. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1964).
.145. Tx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(h) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
146. Id. § 2(d) (emphasis added).
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If an alleged joint tort-feasor makes a settlement with a claim-
ant but nevertheless is joined as a party defendant at the time of
the submission of the case to the jury (so that the existence and
amount of his negligence are submitted to the jury) and his percen-
tage of negligence is found by the jury, the settlement is a complete
release of the portion of the judgment attributable to the percent-
age of negligence found on the part of that joint tort-feasor.1 7
Commentators have assumed that non-settling tortfeasors have
the option whether to invoke credit under section 2(d) or to apply
percentage reduction under section 2(e) and that they exercise that
option by deciding whether to implead the settling tortfeasor and
have the issue of his percentage of negligence submitted to jury."'
On that assumption, section 2(e) perpetuates and codifies the view
that a settling party must be sued for "contribution" by non-settling
tortfeasors although no recovery is obtainable from the settling
party. Alternatively, section 2(d) is applicable to the situation in
which defendants do not seek contribution but do seek a credit.
While that assumption is obviously plausible, it is not the most
straightforward reading of the language of sections 2(d) and 2(e),
which refer to the settling party in terms of whether he is "joined
as a party defendant" at the time the case is submitted to the jury.
It is more sensible to infer that 2(d) is the prevailing settle-
ment/contribution rule, with 2(e) coming into play only when a
settlement occurs after the case is submitted to the jury.
It might be argued that recommendation 5 encourages collusive
settlements, whereby plaintiff could release a highly culpable party
for a relatively small sum and then proceed against the less blame-
worthy tortfeasors without fearing a percentage reduction in the
amount of the settling party's negligence. However, any plaintiff
who believes that he may be adjudged guilty of some negli-
gence-and the great majority of plaintiffs fall into this cate-
gory-must be deterred from omitting a potentially highly culpable
defendant from the lawsuit lest plaintiffs percentage of negligence
be found to exceed that of the defendants sued. Under recommenda-
tion 5, a rational plaintiff would release a potentially highly culpa-
ble solvent tortfeasor only in exchange for a substantial sum of
money that he knew would be credited against any judgment re-
covered from the other tortfeasors. The recurring problem has been
147. Id. § 2(e) (emphasis added).
148. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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the sizable settlement between plaintiff and settling tortfeasor
whereby the settling party buys into plaintiff's lawsuit against the
other defendants."'4 If plaintiff knows that any judgment recovered
against the other defendants is going to be reduced by the full
amount of the settlement, the temptation to enter into one of these
"Mary Carter" arrangements would seem to be greatly reduced.
If the section 2(e) method is used, it is to plaintiff's advantage
to enter into settlement agreements and then litigate against the
non-settling tortfeasors in such a way as to keep the settling tortfea-
sor's negligence percentage as low as possible. The tortfeasor who
does not settle may have no effective way to combat the collusive
agreement between plaintiff and the tortfeasors. On the other hand,
if recommendation 5 were adopted, plaintiff and settling tortfeasor
would know from the outset that any payment made to plaintiff in
settlement will reduce his judgment against the other tortfeasors by
the amount of the settlement payment. Of course, this solution
would entail the risk that plaintiff would release a highly culpable
tortfeasor for a pittance and then sue the remaining tortfeasors in
hopes for a big "windfall." All other things being equal, a sensible
plaintiff would be motivated to do that only if the highly culpable
tortfeasor were insolvent. Moreover, if this is done, why should the
plaintiff bear the entire brunt of the tortfeasor's insolvency? The
current view discourages settlements with tortfeasors who are finan-
cially unable to pay their fair share. Finally, it is convincing that
the potential for collusion-and, probably more importantly, for
wholly legitimate but complicated non-collusive tactical maneuver-
ings-is much greater under the current prevailing view, whereby
defendants who have not settled must guess before the case goes to
the jury whether 2(d) or 2(e) is the better method of crediting the
settlement.
Recommendation 6. A party who settled with plaintiff would
have no contribution or indemnity rights that could be made an
issue in plaintiff's action against the other putative tortfeasors.
Discussion: When one of the putative tortfeasors has settled
with plaintiff, neither plaintiff nor the remaining tortfeasors have
rights against the settling tortfeasor. The settling tortfeasor would
be protected from further liability and from the necessity of becom-
ing a party, albeit wholly nominal, to a lawsuit. Concomitantly, the
"149. Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. 1977); General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 857-59 (Tex. 1977).
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other putative tortfeasors should be permitted to meet their respon-
sibilities to the plaintiff among themselves without attention to the
fact that the settlor may have paid more than his ultimate share of
the claim. This proposal probably continues the status quo in those
situations in which a putative tortfeasor has settled for less than the
full value of plaintiff's claim. 5 "
When a putative tortfeasor has settled for what turns out to be
the full value of the claim, or more, the "one satisfaction" rule51'
means plaintiff has no recovery from the others. In that situation,
and in the situation in which the settling party has indemnity rights
against the other putative tortfeasors, 152 it may seem harsh to deny
the settlor any rights against the others. Here, the "one lawsuit, as
simple as possible" thrust might acceptably yield to the equities so
that the settling tortfeasor could have an action. His action would
be to seek to require that each of the other tortfeasors pay all or a
pro rata share of the damages represented by his payment to plain-
tiff.' " A number of difficult questions would have to be answered:
(1) If the asserted basis for recovery was negligence, would article
2212a be applicable? (2) If the asserted basis for recovery of a por-
tion of the settlement or judgment was something other than negli-
gence, would article 2212 be applicable? 54 (3) What would be the
res judicata (collateral estoppel) effect of findings made in plain-
tiff's action against the non-settling tortfeasors regarding percent-
ages of negligence and amount of damages?' 55 The difficulty in
answering these questions suggests that the legal system should
leave the settling tortfeasor with no further rights against the other
putative tortfeasors. However, it is clear that the principal situation
that the two statutes and the decisional law were developed to
meet-tort victim against putative tortfeasor-can be kept clear of
these questions.
150. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
151. See Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935).
152. Compare the proposal to abolish tort indemnity doctrines, on the view that
"[w]hen two or more tortfeasors are at fault they should share the responsibility to some
degree; no one should be entirely responsible." Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Torts,
32 Sw. L.J. 1, 13 (1978).
153. This right should not turn on whether the settling tortfeasor satisfied a
"judgment." See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
154. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 861-62 (Tex. 1977).
155. See Fisher, Nugent, & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 655, 677 (1974). Cf. Comment, Multiple Party Litigation in Com-
parative Negligence: Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J.
669, 676, 678 (1978).
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Recommendation 7. Named defendants should receive a credit
against their liability to the plaintiff in the amount of the settle-
ment regardless of whether they are successful in proving that a
person who settled with the plaintiff was a joint tortfeasor.
Discussion: In the recent case of Deal v. Madison, 151 the court
of civil appeals achieved a commendable resolution of the problem
confronted in recommendation 7. Plaintiff's decedent died in an
apartment house fire. The potential defendants were: (1) the owner
of the land at the time the apartments were built (Dl); (2) the
architect who designed them (D2); (3) an interim owner (D3); and
(4) the owner at the time of the fire (D4). On the findings ultimately
made by the jury in the case, it is possible to show the result in
tabular form had plaintiff joined all four defendants, had none of
the defendants settled, and had the defendants sought contribution
from one another in the primary lawsuit. The table also shows what




Negli- Liability bution Settled
Party gence Damages to P share for
P 0 $445,000 $ $ $
Defendant 1 45 445,000 200,250
Defendant 2 30 445,000 133,500 130,000
Defendant 3 5 445,000 22,250 5,000
Defendant 4 20 445,000 89,000 450,000
Total 100% $445,000 $585,000
Plaintiff sued D4. Plaintiff settled with D4 for $450,000 and
agreed to pursue the other tortfeasors, reimbursing D4 up to
$300,000 (67¢ on the dollar) out of any recovery achieved.'57 The trial
court approved the settlement and rendered judgment against D4
in the amount of $450,000. Plaintiff sued D1, D2, and D3. D1 im-
pleaded D4 and cross-claimed against D2 and D4 for indemnity.
156. 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
157. The Texas Supreme Court recently looked at these "Mary Carter" agreements in
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), concluding that, while there
are significant arguments such arrangements should be illegal, often their potential for per-
verting the adversary system can be handled by revealing the agreement to the jury. See
note 149 supra and accompanying text.
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Plaintiff settled with D2 ($130,000) and D3 ($5,000) and dismissed
them as defendants. This left the litigation as P v. D1; D1 v. D2 and
D4 for indemnity. Just before submission of the case to the jury, D1
moved to nonsuit D2 and D4 and to have only plaintiff's and Dl's
negligence submitted to the jury because D1 had determined to rely
on the provisions of section 2(d) of article 2212a. Nevertheless, over
Dl's objection, the trial judge submitted the negligence of all parties
to the jury. Alternatively, and to the same effect, D1 argued that
the "one satisfaction" rule expressed in the 1946 Bradshaw's deci-
sion operated in Dl's favor. Under either of those arguments, plain-
tiff would have been entitled to no recovery against D1 because the
amounts paid in settlement by the other alleged tortfeasors
($585,000) surpassed the damages found ($445,000).
D1 waited until the last minute to nonsuit D2 and D4 because
it was difficult to know whether the section 2(d) method of handling
the settlements was more or less advantageous to him than would
have been the alternative method described in section 2(e) of article
2212a. Under the 2(e) method, the settlements made by the other
tortfeasors would have operated to release D1 from liability to plain-
tiff in the percentage of the damages found equal to the combined
percentages of negligence against the settling parties. Under the 2(e)
method, on the facts as found by the jury, Dl's liability to plaintiff
would have been $200,250. Under the 2(d) method, it would have
been $0. Thus, hindsight teaches that D1 was correct to prefer the
2(d) method on these facts because the total amount paid in settle-
ment by the other three tortfeasors far exceeded the total damages.
The trial judge concluded that D1 had waited too late. In the
judge's view, D1 made a binding election by continuing to pursue
his indemnity or contribution claims against D2 and D4 throughout
the trial. Having made that election, he was precluded from later
asserting a credit. This reasoning meant that D1 had to abide by
the 2(e) method of treating the settling tortfeasors, under which D1
would have remained liable for $200,250. However, the trial judge
did not give D1 that reduction either, but entered judgment against
him for the full $445,000, apparently on the view that D1 had ulti-
mately waived that right when he moved to dismiss D2 and D4 as
third-party defendants.
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that plaintiff was
entitled to no further recovery against D1, because plaintiff had
158. Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935).
[Vol. 10:933
NEGLIGENCE
received amounts in settlement that more than equalled the value
of the claim. The course of reasoning, however, was not as direct as
its conclusion seemed to imply. The following propositions were
expressed by the court of appeals regarding its resolution of the case:
(1) Under the pre-2212a law, the remaining tortfeasor, after
settlement by other tortfeasors, was entitled to reduce his liability
to plaintiff by the greater of the amount of the settlements or the
settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of the liability.'5 '
(2) The better view of the pre-2212a law is that the remaining
defendant did not have to assert a third-party claim for contribution
against the settling party in order to assert either of those rights
(credit in amount of settlement, or proportionate reduction); how-
ever, most practitioners and courts proceeded as though a third-
party claim was necessary to the proportionate reduction right.
(3) Unfortunately, sections 2(d) and 2(e) of article 2212a seem
to be based on the assumption that the defendant cannot achieve
percentage reduction of the liability without asserting a third-party
claim against the settling parties.
(4) This feature of article 2212a appears to mean that defen-
dant must elect whether to claim a credit in the amount of the
settlement (2(d)) or a percentage reduction (2(e)) before the case is
submitted to the jury. Here, defendant made an acceptable election
at that time. There is no reason why the defendant cannot pursue
a claim for contribution or indemnity against a settling tortfeasor
up to the time of submission of the case to the jury and then rely
on his right to a credit under section 2(d).
(5) When a defendant does elect to pursue his right to per-
centage reduction by having the negligence of the settling parties
submitted to the jury, it may be that he should have relied on
credit because the amounts paid in settlement exceed the amounts
of the percentage reductions. "We express no opinion on . . .
whether . . . [defendant is entitled to credit] if the defendant
seeks a proportionate [percentage] reduction under subdivision
(e) rather than a deduction under subdivision (d), and fails to
obtain a reduction that would be as much as the amount already
received in settlement.'"10 Because the plaintiff will not be harmed
by the failure of the defendant to make the election before jury
submission unless one assumes that submission of the percentage
159. Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
160. Id. at 420 n.2.
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will cause the jury to reduce the sums set forth in their answers to
the damage issues, no election should be necessary.'
Conclusion
Our recommendations have been made to simplify the practical
choices encountered in negligence litigation. We hope that the com-
plicated history surrounding negligence litigation has been clarified
to some extent.
161. One court of civil appeals has reached the opposite conclusion. Clem-Tex. Ltd. v.
Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
